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ABSTRACT 
This paper compares two approaches toward handling of uncertainty 
in public policy decisions. In one approach, "science first," scientific 
questions of faCt are addressed first. Once it is concluded that there 
is a high probability that there is a problem (for example that a chemical 
is a carcinogen) then the analysis proceeds to value questions, where the 
costs and benefits of possible remedies are weighed. In the alternative 
approach, "policy first," value questions are addressed from the beginning. 
The potential costs and benefits of wrong decisions are considered from 
the start, along with judgments about the probabilities of false positives 
and false negatives. This analysis leads to the identification of the 
scientific uncertainties most critical for the public policy decision; it 
suggests the most important areas for research; and it guides decisions of 
what to do in the meantime, for precautionary actions. 
The discussion is undertaken in terms of a particular public policy 
problem, management of municipal wastewater disposal in coastal waters. 
POLICY FIRST OR SCIENCE FIRST: 
TWO APPROACHES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the focus shifts from science to policy. The 
preceding chapters pull together a large amount of scientific inform.a-
tion related to wastewater and sludge disposal in coastal waters> but 
at the same time they suggest that what is kno"1'n is but a small frac-
tion of what needs to be known for confidence in making some of the 
most important policy decisions. We know little about the effects of 
toxic chemicals> and little about the importance for toxics of 
wastewater and sludge disposal in coastal waters relative to other 
transport mechanisms such as air pollution and groundwater contamina­
tion. There are large gaps in our knowledge of the more traditional 
materials as well � the natural organics, nutrients, and metals. We 
can measure changes in worm populations where sludge is discharged, but 
ue knov little of the long term implications of such disturbances. 
The nature of uncertainty varies from one aspect of the manage-
ment problen. to another, from toxics to pathogens to the other materi-
�1�. lu some areas, such as toxics, uncertainty is very great and 
d.·;;-cision making resembles gambling. In some other areas, the appropri-
zte altern�tives are more clearcut, because in spite of the remaining 
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uncertainties the alternatives are basically few and simple. and the 
weight of evidence leans strongly to one side. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider hov variations in 
uncertainties associated with coastal disposal of wastewater and sludge 
can be taken into account in the formation of policy and decision. Ihe 
starting point for the chapter is the realization that because of 
existing uncertainty, the policy maker is condemned to make decisions 
under uncertainty. A decision to postpone some action until more is 
learned is a decision under uncertainty> just as much as a decision to 
take precautionary action in the meantime. A decision to promote 
further research> and what type of research> is still a decision under 
uncertainty. 
Yet decisions are made "in the meantime." We have built ocean 
outfalls and treatment plants, and we have existing and emerging poli-
cies concerning the level of treatment> pretreatment, disposal and 
source control .  Row such policies c an  b e  understood and assessed and, 
if possible, improved upon is the subject of this and the next two 
chapters. This chapter attempts to build a framework for policy 
analysis. The next chapter considers the legal institutions which pro-
vide means for implementing policy options as well as constraining 
them. The following chapter offers an evaluation of specific policy 
choices. 
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UNCERTAINTY AND THE POLICY APPROACH 
The best place to begin a policy analysis is with questions of 
resource commitment. How and where to commit resources are the "ulti-
mate" policy questions for agencies and legislatures concerned with 
wastewater and sludge disposal into coastal waters. Besides this, 
questions of resource commitment are an important starting point for 
another reason .. 
While there is much to be said for accumulating knowledge for 
its own sake, from the point of view of policy formation � to put the 
matter in perhaps a too utilitarian fashion � the wealth of scientific 
information in the preceding chapters is useful only to the degree that 
it helps resolve questions of where and how to commit resources. To 
put the matter a little more positively, beginning with questions of 
resource commitment helps structure scientific information for decision 
purposes. By itself, scientific inquiry is likely to be an open-ended 
process, with investigation of each interesting question leading to 
three or four more interesting questions. To structure this informa-
tion for decision purposes, we start with a list of policy questions 
which have to be decided at the current time, one way or another (by 
default if not by active choice). We begin with questions of resource 
commitment such as these, list A: 
Al. How much regional variation should there 
be in the treatment of wsstewater and sludge? Previous 
policy in the 1972 FWPCA was toward uniform treatment. 
Section 30l(h) of the 1977 amendments allows for 
some regional variation, but bow much should there be? 
A2. How advanced should be the treatment? 
Generally speaking, the more advanced the treatment 
the more sludge. Where do we stop? 
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AJ. What should be the balance between ocean 
disposal and disposal into other media? How much 
wastewater should be treated and used for groundwater 
recharge and irrigation, if any? Row much sludge to 
landfills and incinerators? Present law, in the Ocean 
Dumping Act, bans ocean discharge of sludge after 1981. 
A4. What should be the balance between treatment 
at the sewage plant and pre-treatment by industrial 
firms before disposal into the municipal sewage 
system? This question applies to metals and toxic 
chemicals, and differently in each case. 
AS. Row much source control should there be? 
This question applies especially to toxic chemicals. 
The only alternatives to ultimate disposal somewhere 
in the environment are chemical transformations to 
harmless molecules or restriction of production in the 
first place. Some chemicals may be sufficiently 
hazardous that they are best controlled at their 
source. 
A6. What research and monitoring should be 
sponsored by government agencies? 
While these questions will help organize the subsequent 
analysis, it is not possible to answer them directly. They depend to a 
large measure on judgements as to the seriousness of the effects of 
wastewater and sludge disposal. The principal questions of effects can 
be briefly enumerated in list B: 
Bl. How bad is the toxics problem? Obviously 
the response to this and other effects questions will 
vary with the location and particular situation. 
B2. How bad is the problem with pathogens and 
communicable disease? 
B3. How much damage is there to recreation and 
use of coastal water; how much aesthetic effect is there? 
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:B4. How severe is the stress to marine populations? 
These questions in turn depend upon interpreting the existing scien-
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tific information. 
The policy analyst and the scientist tend to work in opposite 
directions. To organize and focus his inquiry, the policy analyst 
begins with the ultimate, practical questions of decision (list A) and 
works back to effects (list B) and then to what is known about marine 
transport, chemical and biological systems. The scientist tends to 
work forward, beginning with the physical inputs to the coastal waters, 
to model the causal flows as they move forward in time.! In this 
chapter the treatment of uncertainty (and correspondingly the value of 
information) is derived from the policy analyst's approach. Both 
approaches are needed; they contribute to each other as sketched in 
Figure 1. 
In terms of Figure 1 the science approach, followed in much of 
the book, begins in the upper left corner and works down toward the 
lower right corner. Actual mechanisms cannot be understood directly, 
but scientists try to make their models correspond to the actual 
mechanisms as closely as possible � knowledge for its own sake. Much 
attention is devoted to tightening the correspondences (a) and develop­
ing detailed submodels. 
Cost-benefit analysis focuses on the evaluation of effects and 
the costs of control (b). There are few cost-benefit studies of 
wastewater disposal, and most of the attention appears to be on the 
quantification of recreational benefits from waste treatment (Freeman, 
1979a) and the engineering costs of conventional sewage treatment 
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(Mueller, Chapter 2 of this volume). A narrowly focused cost-benefit 
analysis accepts the predicted effects as more or less given and con­
centrates on the problems of evaluation (Freeman, 1979b). 
Although concerned with the evaluation of decisions, this 
chapter does not attempt a narrowly focused cost-benefit analysis. A 
broader approach for analysis of wastewater and sludge disposal is 
adopted because of the dominating role of uncertainty. How we 11allo­
cate11 or treat existing uncertainties and the steps taken toward their 
resolution have major, sometimes determining, effects on actual deci­
sions. For example, DDT in wastewater discharges into the Southern 
California Bight were not regulated until large volumes of DDT were 
discovered in the wastewater (about 1970). Once discovered, regulation 
by source controls did not wait for a quantified cost-benefit study of 
the damage to marine ecosystems from this discharge. In a similar way, 
whether or not a chemical is banned depends more on the strength of 
evidence of its carcinogenicity and potency than on a fine-tuned argu­
ment as to the value of life. The basic question to be addressed is 
bow evaluations of the costs and benefits of effects and possible con­
trol measures are to be brought together with the uncertainties that 
pervade the prediction of effects and understanding of marine mechan­
isms. 
Given the complexity of marine mechanisms and the enormous 
number of uncertainties involved> it is fair to ask at the outset what 
might be gained from a policy approach that attempts to work back from 
potential decisions in the lower right corner of Figure l cu�ard the 
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phenomena of the upper left. Three types of benefit can be dis-
ti_nguished. 
First in a few cases the analysis might be cut and dried 
effects and control possibilities are well enough understood so that 
the expected net benefits of alternative decisions can be estimated 
quantitatively, and a single course of action selected as offering the 
highest net benefits. 
Second, in other cases the uncertainties are sufficiently per-
vasive so that explicit calculation of expected net benefits from 
alternative possible decisions is not very helpful. Nonetheless, 
"islands of relative certainty11 rise above the general sea of uncer-
tainty. These islands are not built upon underwater mountains of evi-
dence, like normal islands, but on broad understanding of vhat appear 
to be the largest and most important effects, in their qualitative 
evaluation of costs and benefits. In such cases, the existing evidence 
is not conclusive in a scientific sense, but has been accumulating in 
favor of the relative certainty, and it appears that further resolution 
of uncertainty vill strengthen the evidence. For example, concern with 
toxic chemical discharge into ocean water existed a decade ago (Brooks, 
1971) .  Research in the intervening period has strengthened our �on-
cern, and it appears likely that future research will further 
strengthen it. Several islands of relative certainty with their policy 
implications are tentatively identified in this chapter and discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 13. 
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Third, and perhaps most important, the policy approach, even 
when not yielding specific decisions, may offer some guidance as to the 
process of policy.formation. 
In other words, how one thinks about the various uncertainties 
associated with effects has a large impact on the control measures 
adopted. What is needed is a framework flexible enough to encompass 
the range of uncertainties associated with wastewater and sludge 
discharge. This range can be described in terms of the materials 
discharged, divided into four classes. 
A Spectrum of Uncertainty 
Class I includes nutrients and natural organic material in the 
form of suspended solids, ammonia and other natural oxygen-demanding 
materials. These materials naturally cycle through ecosystems in large 
quantities. Class II includes pathogens: bacteria and viruses. Class 
III includes heavy metals like lead and cadmium in concentrations far 
greater than natural systems. Class IV includes toxic chemicals which, 
by affecting the genetic code (genotoxic), may cause cancer, tera-
togenic effects, and other diseases. A large number of synthetic 
organics and radioactive materials fall into this class. 
> 
As a crude generalization, uncertainty increases from Class I 
to IV. We know most about the mechanisms and effects of the natural 
materials in Class I. For example, models can predict with some conf i-
dence the effects of discharge of BOD (biological oxygen demand) on 
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dissolved oxygen concentrations. The diffusion and die-off rates for 
pathogens have also been well studied, as the control of pathogens has 
been a primary concern in sewage treatment. However, there are impor-
tant uncertainties still remaining in our understanding of pathogens, 
as noted in Chapter 8. One such uncertainty is how well coliform, an 
indicator bacterium, matches the die-off rates for the pathogens of 
real concern, both in the treatment process and in the marine environ-
ment. 
The presence of heavy metals in sewage became a concern when it 
was found that large slugs of them could temporarily upset the sewage 
treatment process. Also, until the 1970s it was thought that the addi-
tion of metals to the background levels in seawater was small and there 
was little or no bioaccumulation of them in the food chain. But it is 
now known that waste discb.arges of metals are of a higher fraction of 
the background levels than previously thought (Morel and Schiff, 
Chapter 6 of this volume). Moreover, we now know that some metals can 
be biologically activated, for example methyl mercury. Once activated, 
some become toxic chemicals. Some bioconcentrate up the food chain, 
like a number of other toxic chemicals. Methylization of mercury came 
as a surprise, and there are important remaining uncertainties a� to 
which metals, under what conditions, can become bioactivated. 
But probably the largest uncertainties are associated with the 
enormous number of industrially produced chemicals that find their way 
into wastewater and sludge. We know little about the long term toxi-
city of all but a relative handful of the 75,00& chemicals in active 
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commerce, many of which are new chemicals, synthesized after World War 
II.2 We do not know how many of these chemicals, in what quantities, 
find their way to municipal wastewater systems and thence to coastal 
waters. We do not know the relative importance of wastewater systems 
as a conduit compared with other forms of transport and dispersion. Of 
the relatively small number of chemicals that have been tested ade-
quately (perhaps several hundred for cancer and fewer for other long 
term effects such as teratogenicity), we have only rudimentary 
knowledge of toxic potency, with estimates often ranging over several 
orders of magnitude. For these largely unknown and uncharacterized 
chemicals the key questions for coastal disposal are: (1) how much is 
being discharged? (2) how toxic? (3) how persistent? (4) how likely 
to bioaccumulate, ultimately as a pathway to human exposure? and �5) 
what effect on marine populations? 
Several factors help explain this generalization of increasing 
uncertainty from Class I to IV, as crude as it is: 
Numbers. In Class I there are only a few aggregate indexes of 
concern, such as BOD and SS; in Class II a relatively small number of 
important diseases of concern; in Class III, though a small number of 
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metals, a larger and undetermined number of reaction products; in Class 
IV an enormously larger number of candidate chemicals to begin with, 
often at very low concentrations (ppb and below). 
Pathways. Knowledge about pathways decreases u we move from 
Class I to Class IV. Class I materials move along well known natural 
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pathways, while Class IV pollutants have long half lives and pathways 
of many complex steps. 
Latency. Some of the effects of Class I materials are almost 
immediate; some of the effects of pathogens occur within a few days of 
discharge; some of the effects of bioactivated metals may take several 
years to manifest themselves; the usual latency for carcinogens is 20 
to 40 years from the time of exposure (not including the time of bioac­
cumulation); and for mutagens the latency may be a generation or more. 
Visibility. Somewhat associated with the other factors, the 
effects of Class I materials are typically more readily apparent than 
those of Class IV. 
Zero-Infinity Dilernrnas 
The costs and benefits associated with a control alternative 
also vary over a wide range. At one end of the range the underlying 
effects may be reasonably well understood and the costs and benefits of 
controlling the effect quantified with some confidence, as with smells 
and other simple aesthetics. In such cases uncertainty plays a minor 
role, and the control activity is undertaken to the point where the 
incremental costs are equal to the incremental benefits. Such c!ses 
can be called cases of classical pollution. and are most amenable to 
classical cost-benefit analysis) where uncertainty plays a minor role.
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At the other end of the range (Class IV) an effect is not well 
understood, nor the underlying mechanisms. Nonetheless, it is useful 
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to compare the potential environmental cost with its precautionary cost 
of contro l. As the term has been used in the area of nuclear safety, a 
"zero-infinity dilemma" is one where there is some small assessed pro-
bability of a catastrophic cost. Thirty years ago methylization of 
mercury appeared highly unlikely; yet the cost of control of mercury 
discharge (basically source control) was small compared with the damage 
done by the bioactivated chemical. Those observations lead to a 
second, crude generalization � control problems for Class I pollutants 
often tend to have a classical pollution character; the pollutants in 
Class IV a zero-infinity character. For one thing, Class I pollutants 
often affect recreational and aesthetic values, while Class IV pollu-
tants are associated with dreaded disease (but so are some of the 
pathogens of Class II). For another, many of the effects associated 
with Class I pollutants are readily reversible, whereas the effects of 
Class III and IV are more irreversible.4 
Several characteristics taken together, which define a notion 
of environmental risk,5 apply to Class IV pollutants. The relatively 
large amount of ignorance, which leads to pervasive uncertainties all 
along the modeling process, has already been mentioned. So have 
relative irreversibility, which not only makesmistakes in the direction , 
of insufficient precaution costly, but also long in time to correct; 
latency; and the "zero-infinity"characteristic. These characteristics 
tend to make pollutants of. environmental risk difficult to manage, in 
establishing institutions and incentives leadin& to the "proper" amount 
of control. 
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'!\Jo other characteristics add to the difficulty. These cbarac­
te.ristics tend to apply to all pollutants, not just ones of environmen­
tal risk, but they are important charact eristics of the latter as well. 
First, the costs are external. The costs of Class IV pollutants are 
widely diffused in time and location; the costs are borne not by the 
generators of the costs but by the public at large. Second, benefits 
are internal. The benefits accrue to the private firms generating the 
risks, in the form of lower operating costs Sewerage agencies who do not 
take control measures also benefit in lower operating costs. How these 
characteristics of internal benefit and external cost complicate the 
control process is illustrated by a comparison of Class IV pollutants 
with Class III pollutants.  The charact eristic of external costs 
applies less strongly to Class III pollutants.  The basic reason why 
metals came into control,  by pretreatment , was that some of the costs 
�borne internally by the . treatment plant , rather than externally by
the public at large. Thus it was to the advantage of the operators of 
treatment plant s ,  who were accountable for the internal costs of the 
plant s ,  to control metals. Metals were affecting plant operations and 
raising treatment costs. A similar incentive for control do�s not 
exist for Class IV pollutants, which do not directly increase the costs 
of operating a treatment plant . In contrast with the classical pollu­
tants of Class I, pollutants of Class IV tend to have more of the 
environmental risk characteristic. 
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MAXIMIZING NET BENEFITS 
The goal in this section is to apply a decision analysis which 
is flexible enough to encompass the spectrum of uncertainty and the 
range of balance t� extreme imbalance of costs and benefits. The 
analysis is driven by a maximization of expected net benefits ,  tailored 
to the situation where information is incomplete but can be improved 
through research or testing (Weiner et 'al., 1979; Pauker and Kassirer , 
1980; Weinstein, 1979; Page,  in press). Examples of decisions which 
fit into this framework include the following . The decision to extend 
the Orange County outfall from its original design length; the decision 
(as yet unmade) whether or not to increase the capacity of the treat­
ment system to better accommodate storm water overflows in San Fran­
cisco; and the decision to ban dieldrin (an example of control by 
source reduction) . 
Hypotheses and � Costs Q.f Being Wrong 
We begin with a hypothesis about the existence or non-existence 
of some adverse environmental effect. One such hypothesis is that some 
part icular chemical is a human carcinogen, which when released at a 
certain rate to seawater at some location will b ioconcentrate to 10 ppm 
in certain fish. The evidence may be fragmentary and weak for this 
hypothesis and the likelihood of it may seem low. Another hypothesis 
is that with an extension of an outfall to eight k ilor:i.eters into deep 
water in a particular region the shoreline coliform count will exceed 
10/ml less than 5 percent of the time. So much may be known about the 
short term diffusion around the outfall, and the other mechanics of the 
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problem, that this hypothesis might be held true (or false) with a much 
higher degree of confidence. 
Generally, hypotheses can be stated in one way and then res­
tated in the opposite way. For the sake of definiteness, subsequent 
hypotheses will be stated about the existence of some adverse environ­
mental effect. By setting up our hypotheses as ones hypothesizing the 
existence of adverse environmental effects, we are able to interpret 
consistently the �2.iA. false positive as equal in magnitude to the 
resource cost of precautionary control. Note that the cost of a false 
positive is borne only when we act to mitigate a potential environmen­
tal harm, which happens to be nonexistent. The cost of a false posi­
tive is the cost of one type of wrong decision. Because we are dealing 
in relative costs we can count the cost of precautionary control as one 
unit. 
The £Q.!!, of .!. false negative arises when we reject the 
hypothesis of an adverse environmental effect, but the effect exists. 
We can count the full environmental cost of this harm. as D+l units. If 
the correct decision had been made the D+l cost of environmental harm 
could have been avoided, but at the resources cost of one unit, for the 
precautionary action. Thus the net saving by undertaking the pr�cau-
t ionary action is the difference, or D units. Thus we count D as the 
� .2f .!. �negative. For Class III and IV pollutants the cost of 
a false negative may be several fold the cost of a false positive; in 
other words D may be 1'much" higher than one. Alternatively, D is nega­
tive when the cost of control is higher than the environmental harm 
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prevented. The cost of a false negative is the cost of the second type 
of wrong decision. 
It may seem more comprehensive and balanced to consider four 
cases: the cost of precautionary action when the environmental 
hypothesis is true (one unit); the cost of no action when the environ­
mental hypothesis is false (zero units); the cost of not taking precau­
tionary action when the environmental hypothesis is true (D+l units); 
and the cost of taking precautionary action when the environmental 
hypothesis is not true (one unit). This explicitly takes into account 
the direct costs of right decisions as well as the costs of wrong deci­
sions. But in this chapter we are measuring the costs of wrong deci­
sions in the opportunity sense, as the cost of the wrong decision rela­
tive to the cost that could have been avoided if the right decision had 
been taken. Thus the cost of a false positive is (one minus zero) or 
one, and the cost of a false negative is (D+l minus one) or D� In this 
way the costs associated with right decisions are implicitly taken into 
account, and the analysis made more compact. Whether all the cases are 
analyzed explicitly or only the wrong decisions are analyzed in an 
opportunity cost sense, the strategies of minimum expected cost are the 
same and the approaches equivalent. 
Likelihood of Bypotbeses, Existing Information 
After consideration of all the existing information, not all 
hypotheses appear equally likely. For an analysis of expected net 
benefits, some evaluation of likelihoods is needed. And here lies one 
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of the principal differences in the approaches sketched in Figure 1 .  
Traditionally many scientists prefer not to evaluate the relative 
likelihoods of hypotheses in terms of quantitative, subjective proba­
bility assignments. The usual reason given for this reluctance is that 
too little is known about the truth or falsehood of the hypotheses to 
provide the grounds for numerical statements of likelihood. If pressed 
for quantification of some effect, instead of approaching the matter by 
developing subjective probability assignments for the underlying 
hypotheses, a different approach is taken. "Most likely" or "conserva­
tive11 hypotheses are adopted; point estimates are calculated as though 
the hypotheses were true; and then a "safety factor" or "margin of 
error" is applied at the end. Decision theorists counterargue that 
this approach precludes the examination of minor hypotheses, which may 
have important implications for precautionary control (it makes the 
decision tree too narroW); provides no basis for determining how large 
should be the factor of safety; and concentrates on the propagation of 
measurement error while neglecting error in the specification of models 
where the most critical uncertainties often lie (National Academy of 
Sciences, 1980; Leamer, 1978). 
For our purposes the matter is not either/or. Full quantifica-' 
tion of subjective probability assignments of the likelihoods of 
hypotheses is not necessary, any more than is the full quantification 
of costs and benefits of the various effects and control alternatives. 
Ibe analysis proceeds as though such quantifications could be made, but 
then is interpreted, as much as possible, qualitatively, in terms of 
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more or less likely, more or less costly. In· fact, there is no point 
in full quantification of assessed likelihoods of various hypotheses, 
when it is not possible to quantify fully the costs and benefits of the 
alternative effects. We note in passing, though, that there is a grow-
ing literature on why some sort of evaluation of the relative likeli-
hoods of hypotheses is necessary, bow such evaluations can be done, and 
bow accurate and consistent they are (Raiffa, 1970; Fischhoff, in 
press; Morgan, 1979; Savage, 1971; Hogarth, 1975). 
Here for the exposition we will focus on just one hypothesis at 
a time and write the assessed odds agai�st it as N:l. For an environ-
mental risk, N is definitionally greater than 1 ,  the hypothesis of harm 
being considered less likely than the benign alternative, perhaps many 
fold less likely (N several fold bigger than one). For a classic pol-
lutant, N is typically less than one, with the hypothesis more likely 
than not. Similarly, for a classical pollutant the costs of wrong 
decisions, either way, are often roughly comparable (especially for the 
marginal decision), and even when the adverse hypothesis is true the 
net saving from a precautionary decision, D, is "near" zero, perhaps 
well between one and minus one. But for an environmental risk, the net 
saving from a precautionary decision, D, is large compared with. �ts 
cost, still counted as one unit. In other words, by definition, for 
classic pollutants both N and D are small, for ones of eOvironmental 
risk both N and D are large. 
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New Information, Probability of Error 
In their general setting, classical and environmental risk pol­
lutants both require evaluating existing information, defining·research 
issues, and "updating" the existing information from research and sta­
tistically interpretable tests of the data. Although for a given deci­
sion, with its researchable questions, there are likely to be many 
research issues and many tests of them, we can think of the many tests 
as one composite test, which when undertaken will either lead us to 
accept or reject the hypothesis in question. 
With pervasive uncertainties the nev information is unable to 
resolve ·the question with certainty. For a given empirical test, the 
test may erroneously suggest that the hypothesis is true when it is 
not. This outcome is a false positive.6 The probability of a false 
positive is known as the significance level of the test, and is cus­
tomarily denoted a. For well understood tests this probability is 
easily quantifiable, and customarily tests are designed so that a is 5 
percent, an "acceptably low" probability of a. false positive. For new 
information not gained through a statistically designed test there is 
still some probability that the information will indicate the 
hypothesis is true when it is not, but this probability is not easily 
quantifiable (unless the new information is so overwhelming we m�bt 
assign a zero probability of a false positive). 
As for the other type of error� the test may erroneously sug­
gest that the hypothesis is false when it is true. Ibis outcome is 
known as a false negative. The probability of a false negative is cus­
tomarily denoted �- For well understood tests this probability is also 
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directly quantifiable, although its calculation depends upon the magni­
tude of the effect (for the calculation of a the magnitude o� th� 
effect is assumed zero) and thus is sometimes more difficult. Again, 
for infonn.ation gained outside the structure of a formal statistical 
test, there will still be some probability of new information suggest­
ing that the adverse envirollmental effect is absent when it exists (a 
false negative), but this probability is not easily quantifiable. 
At this point we can state another important difference between 
the two approaches sketched in Figure 1. In the science-first approach 
it is customary to first set a to some predefined level, often 5 per­
cent. Then for a given research and testing budget a statistical test 
is chosen to minimize S subject to a �qual to the preset level. Notice 
in the selection of the test and a and $ that evaluation of the rela­
tive costs and benefits plays no role. In the policy approach, the 
relative costs and benefits play a role as important as a and $. Max­
imizing net benefits is equivalent to minimizing the expected costs of 
wrong decisions, which is done by minimizing the sum of the probabili­
ties of false positives and false negatives, weighted by the costs of 
false positives and false negatives. This equivalence is noted and 
used in the section The Maximization, below. 
Together a and B characterize the information content of a sta­
tistical test or proposed new research. It would be reassuring if for 
a given decision we could set up the relevant hypothesis and empirical 
test of it so that both � and B were small, both equal to or less than 
5 percent. Although this appears possible with some classical 
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pollutants, for which information is more complete, it appears unreal-
istic for typical environmental risk pollutants, for which information 
is highly incomplete. As we shall see more clearly later, when numeri-
cal calculations are presented, the difference between the science-
first and the policy-first approaches to uncertainty in new information 
matters less for classical pollutants than for pollutants of environ-
mental risk. 
£Q.§J;. ,Q.f New Information 
Finally, to complete the framework of expected cost, we need to 
compare the cost of acquiring new information with its value. The 
value is measured by its effect in decreasing the risk of too much pre-
cautionary behavior ,and the risk of too little. For a particular deci-
sion the cost of new information from additional research and testing 
is counted as T units, where a unit is the cost of a false positive. 
The Maximization 
Once the decision under consideration is specified, the 
relevant hypothesis stated, the existing information incorporated into 
an assessment of the odds or likelihood of the hypothesis, and new 
• 
research specified which would help resolve the uncertainty, there are 
basically three decisions possible. 
First, one concludes that the research would not provide infor-
mation sufficient to justify its costs and the decision maker acts on 
the basis of accepting the hypothesis as true (that the harmful 
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environmental effect exists). The higher the cost of a false negative 
the more appropriate this decision. 
Second, one concludes that the research would not provide 
information sufficiently valuable to justify its cost, and the decision 
maker acts on the basis of rejecting the hypothesis. The higher the 
cost of a false positive (unnecessary precautionary action) relative to 
the cost of a false negative, the more appropriate this decision. 
Third, the additional research is undertaken, the hypothesis 
accepted or rejected, and precautionary action taken or not taken on 
the basis of the new information combined with the existing informa-
tion. 
It is possible for the first decision to be sometimes appropri-
ate even in the extreme case when the resource cost of gathering addi-
tional information is zero. Such situations can arise when the cost of 
a false negative is high. Even if the resource cost of gathering new 
information is zero, there is a risk of a false negative as long as 6 
is greater than zero. By deciding to act precautionarily the potential 
cost of a false negative is avoided at the cost of a false positive, 
which occurs whenever the hypothesis is false. Since the assess;d pro-
bability of the hypothesis being false is N/(N+l) and the cost of a 
false positive is valued at one unit, the expected cost of this deci-
sion is just7 
N/(N+l). (1)
At the other extreme the cost of precautionary control is high 
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in comparison with the cost of a false negative. Gathering new infor­
mation and relying on it entails the risk of a false positive. which 
can be avoided altogether if the new information is not sought and the 
hypothesis is rejected on the basis of existing inform:i.tion . In this 
case the cost of a false negative is borne whenever the hypothesis is 
in fact true. With the probability of the latter event assessed at 
l/(N+l) and the cost of a false negative valued at D, the expected cost 
is 
D/{N+ l). 
In between the extremes we gather the new information and con­
dition action on the basis of the combined new and old information. We 
also bear the resource cost of the test, which we can count in unit s T ,  
relative to the cost o f  control (the cost o f  a false positive) . The 
expected cost of this decision is 
D$/(N+l) + No/(N+l) + T. 
In principle the approach of cost minimization directs us to 
select the smallest of (1), (2) and (3). In selecting (3) it is possi­
ble to consider tests of different cost {T), and with various prob�bil­
ities of false positives and false negatives. For a given cost of the 
test, a and 8 11trade off11; that is, if ve insist on a lower a, tq. we 
must live with a higher 8, and vice versa. It is possible to bring 
both down simultaneous ly, by increasing the cost of the test or 
research project, but there are limits to the gain in test information 
even with very expensive tests. 
In practice, it is hard to quantify all these variables and 
(2) 
(3) 
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trade-offs. Nonetheless'some quantifications are possible, as we 
illustrate below. Moreover, the framework of expected cost helps guide 
qualitative inferences which will also be discussed below. The 
geometry of this framework is outlined in the Appendix. 
Levels of Uncertainty 
A basic purpose in setting up this expected net benefit is to 
provide for essential roles for uncertainty in the analy.sis. Uncer­
tainty can be analyzed at several levels: uncertainty concerning exist­
ing info.rmation, as to the likelihood of the hypothesis, or uncertainty 
as to the proper assessment of N; uncertainty as to the completeness of 
new information, or uncertainty as to a and 8 and the power of new 
research to resolve the existing uncertainties; and uncertaillty as to 
the magnitudes of the potential harms and the costs of precautionary 
controls. For some very well understood effects in Class I pollutants 
the first two types of uncertainty may not be important, and may drop 
out of the analysis .  To model the non-probabilistic case, set N�O. In 
this case there is no need to acquire new information about environmen­
tal effects and the only question is whether D>O or D<O . If D>O, the 
cost of environmental harm is greater than the resource cost of con-
• 
trol, and the preventive action is worth the cost . If D<O, the cost of 
prevention is more than the cost of the environmental harm, and the 
control is not worth its cost. Thus in this limiting case attention 
shifts from the probabilistic and statistical aspects of decision mak­
ing to the deterministic ones estimating the engineering costs of con-
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trol and measuring the environmental harm (quality of recreation dimin­
ished and so on). Much of standard cost-benefit analysis is focused in 
this direction. 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
A few examples may help illustrate some of the foregoing ideas. 
The first example is rather simple and its common sense solution does 
not require the formalization of expected value maximization of the 
last section. It serves more to illustrate some of the preceding 
definitions. In the second example the formalization of expected bene­
fit maximization contributes to a clearer understanding of acceptable 
risk and its use in setting standards for pollution control. The third 
example suggests the likely asymmetries for Class IV pollutants. 
1 .  Design of Treatment Facility 
In the design of an ocean outfall, one of the basic engineering 
decisions is its length from shore. The analysis involves a trade-off 
between marginal environmental benefits of greater distance from shore 
(and greater depth) and the increased cost of construction and opera­
tiOfi. If the chosen length is fairly long, so that shoreline im�acts 
(like coliform counts) are already predicted to be low, the incremental 
benefits from a small increase in length may be small and hard to meas­
ure. But the incremental costs may also be small, because the pipe 
loyi�e equipment is already at the working site, the difficult surf­
zone �ection has to be completed anyway, and the incremental length is 
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the easiest part to build. Thus installing more pipe may cost only one 
half the average unit cost. In contrast, remobiliz,ing later to extend 
the pipe length (if it turns out to be necessary) may cost three times 
the average cost now or six times the present incremental (marginal) 
cost because of the need to mobilize the equipment again and rearrange 
the diffuser section. 
In this case the designer may decide as a precaution to extend 
the outfall a little further because it is relatively cheap insurance 
in case the water quality does not come out as favorably as predicted. 
In other words, the cost of a false positive equals the incremental 
cost of extending the outfall. If it turns out that the extra length 
is needed to protect the water quality, this is a true positive. (In 
this model water quality is "adequately" protected by minimizing the 
sum of environmental costs and management costs.) If it turns out that 
the extra length is not needed, this is a false positive. The cost of 
a false positive represents the money that could have been saved had 
there been perfect information from the beginning. 
From the point of view of the sewerage agency concerned only 
with internal costs and meeting mandated standards, the cost of a false 
negative can be defined directly. If the outfall were not extended and 
has to be extended later, this would be a false negative. The cost of 
a false negative is the amount that could have been saved had there 
been perfect information and the outfall been built right, at the 
beginning. The cost of a false negative is five.units, counting as one 
unit the incremental cost of extension at the original time of 
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construction and six units as the incremental cost of extension later. 
(Net saving is D = 6-1 = 5.) 8 
However , the agency, whether it is local, state or federal ,  may 
be interested in more than minimizing the expected construction and 
operating costs, subject to meeting existing water quality standards. 
It may be concerned with how well the standards reflect the true poten-
tial environmental danage from waste discharge. And in principle, the 
cost of a false negative is defined in terms of the potential environ-
mental damage from insufficient precautionary action, rather than the 
cost of remedy if remedy is later required. Nonetheles s ,  the cost of 
remedy compared with the cost of original construction is relevant. 
Estimating the potential environmental cost is likely to be much more 
difficult and uncertain than estimating the incremental costs of con-
struction. And thus the ratio of incremental construction costs (five 
in this case) , can be viewed as the cost of insurance against the 
largely unquantified environmental risks , where the higher the ratio 
the lower the cost of insurance. 
In a case like this, the decision to. extend the outfall clearly 
depends on how much confidence the engineer has in the water quality 
' 
analysis. Since it is not a precise art, it is attractive to run the 
risk of overbuilding the outfall when D (defined in terms of internal 
costs) is as high as five. On the West Coast (see Table ?? in Chapter 
4) outfalls have been made very long. For example, the Orange County 
Outfall extends 27,400 ft (8352 m) off the Orange County coast .  The 
outfall was made probably 5, 000 ft longer than necessary
9 
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to meet the regulatory requirements, but it was felt that the assurance 
of high performance and other benefits made it an attractive expenditure. 
Other factors entered into the decision also, such as the tendency for 
the requirements to get tighter during the lifetime of the outfall, 
which may be as long as 75 years. 
A second design example suggests another pattern of potential 
costs and benefits . The problem is what to do about combined sewer 
overflows, such as is faced in many large eastern cities and the City 
of San Francisco on the West Coast. Because of the large volume of 
street runoff going into the sewers during rainstorms , the normal dry-
weather tr�atment plants are completely inadequate to handle the 
suddenly increased flow when it rains . Therefore, overflows of 
untreated wastewater mixed w�th street runoff may occur in coastal 
waters , but this occurs only a few percent of the time during the year 
(e.g., four percent of the time in San Francisco where the rainy period 
is confined to the winter months) .  Because of the transitory nature of 
these overflows , they do not appear to be very damaging ecologically, 
and are often regarded primarily as �esthetic nuisances. Coliform 
counts may exceed requirements for a day or two during and after the 
rain. 
But in fundamental contrast with the previous example, the pre-
cautionary cost of control is rot,pl':.ly comparable to the. cost of remedy, 
if control is postponed. That is, later control appears to be no more 
expensive in real dollars than proceeding at present with schemes of 
large storage vaul ts, pumping plants and greatly increased treatment 
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plants to handle this increased motif. 
This leaves us to compare the potential costs of environmental 
harm with precautionary costs of control. The cost of precautionary 
control, for stormwater runoff, seems to be very high (e.g., about $1.5 
billion capital cost alone for the City of San Francisco) . If indeed 
stormwater runoff constitutes primarily a problem of transitory, 
aesthetic nature, the cost of a false negative will be low relati�e to 
the cost of a false positive, and may even be less than the cost of a 
false positive. To the extent that stormwater runoff poses a toxics 
problem, the question is how much the proposed treatment would control 
toxics. If little, then there is little precautionary benefit for tox­
ics, and the cost of a false negative, for this type of control is 
retrofitting an existing system, it appears that D may be close to 1 or 
even negative. 
In the case of a stormwater overflow, the immediate effects are 
well understood because the overflows have already been ongoing for 
many years, and continuation of the present method of operation is not 
very risky in terms of encountering large unknowns, for the short term 
effects. 
A long-run solution for cities Yith combined sewers is to 
replace them gradually over a long period of time with a system of 
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separate sewers, realizing that sooner or later sewers have to be 
replaced on something like a hundred-year cycle. 
In this second example, even though the environmental effects 
are still uncertain, there is less motivation to proceed than there was 
in the first example, because D appears to be smaller in the second 
example. As we have seen, D is by no means the only consideration, but 
it is useful to distinguish among different patterns of costs of false 
positives and false negatives , in different decision problems. It is 
also worth noting that the Environmental Protection Agency has required 
some cities to adopt very expensive management programs for controlling 
wastewater overflows, such as in San Francisco , so that this analysis 
of potential costs is of direct practical importance. 
2. Acceptable Risk 
Health standards for water quality and hence effluent discharge 
depend directly on a concept of acceptable risk. The science-first 
approach leads toward one notion of acceptable risk, and the policy­
first approach another. The two approaches treat hoth u�ceTtain�y and 
evaluation differently, as will be shown in terms o� � statistical 
example. One conclusion to be drawn from the example is ttat these 
differences are less important to their policy implic�tions for Class I 
and II pollutants than for Class IV pollutants. 
In the science-first approach attention is focused on the role 
of a false positive. First it must be shown that, with a high degree 
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of confidence, some harmful effect is associated with a pathogen or 
chemical. Once that is done, an ample margin of safety is allowed to 
cover for the uncertainties associated with the magnitude of effect and 
pathways to exposure. The final result is an "acceptable daily intake" 
or a "tolerance limit." Generally, in the determination of risk, the 
cost of a false negative is not a consideration, nor its probability, 
nor the cost of a false positive. The analysis turns upon the proba­
bility of a false positive, and then the safety factor, which is more 
or less arbitrarily chosen. In a sense, the uncertainties which arise 
at each stage of the analysis are saved up until the end, where they 
blossom in the margin of safety. 
"Acceptable daily intakes" (ADI) and "tolerance limits" should 
be interpreted with caution. First, as already noted, of the many 
thousands of chemicals of concern, only a small fraction have been 
tested. If an ADI or "tolerance limit" does not exist for a chemical, 
this does not imply that the chemical is safe in any exposure, although 
the chemical is often treated as though this were true. Second, some 
of the ADis and tolerance limits are primarily based on tests for acute 
toxicity and then projected into limits for chronic toxicity (or� 
genetic toxicity). But the relationship between acute toxicity and 
genetic toxicity can vary widely. Third, the validity of a large 
number of the tests is now uncertain. For one example, the largest 
testing firm in the world, Industrial Bio-Test, went bankrupt amid 
charges of fraud and incompetent testing, leaving in its wake some 600 
tolerances with questionable legitimacy. Fourth, the interactions or 
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synergisms along chemicals in combination may be far more important 
than the chemicals acting separately. Generally the ADis and tolerance 
limits are based on tests of chemicals in isolation. Yet there are 
cases where a non-carcinogen potentiates a carcinogen a thousand-fold. 
These sorts of interactions will be missed entirely in many of the 
tests leading to ADI and tolerances. But these possible interactions 
are clearly important for risk assessment of wastewater and sludge 
disposal, partly because of the large numbers of chemicals in the waste 
stream and partly because of the large number of chemicals in the 
receiving waters. Thus for all these reasons, it is important not to 
take ADis and tolerances at face value as though they provided suffi­
cient protection with virtual certainty, because of their safety fac­
tors. 
We consider here one source of uncertainty which arises in the 
course of testing. For testing chemicals of suspected carcinogenicity, 
the most respected and widely used test is some form of the National 
Cancer Institute bioassay. It is useful to discuss this test here for 
several reasons: the probabilities of the false positives and false 
negatives are well defined and can be calculated explicitly; tbe�nature 
of the trade-off between a and S becomes clearer; and the difference 
between uncertainty within a model and uncertainty as to model specif i­
cat ion is illustrated. And it will illustrate why the difference 
between the science approach and policy approach is more important for 
Class IV pollutants than for Class I. 
The NCI bioassay is a more or less standard test, involving 50 
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rodents ( usually mice or rats) in a control group, and 50 in each 
treated group. Often there are two treatments, at different doses of 
the chemical under investigation. The two sexes are typically treated 
in separate groups; often two strains, or two different species, are 
used; and about twenty sites on the animal are studied for pathological 
response over the lifetime experiment. The Fisher exact test is usu­
ally used to interpret the number of cancers in the treated and control 
groups. For many of the most important test species and strains, the 
background level of cancer in the controls is about 2 percent for most 
sites (background rates for breast cancer in women and lung cancer for 
both men and women are several time� this). 
If a chemical is a potent carcinogen for which there is little 
other toxic effect, the Fisher exact test is very likely to detect the 
carcinogen (the false negative probability B is low). Suppose, for 
example, that a chemical has no acutely toxic effects and can be fed to 
animals to elevate the risk of cancer to be 15 times larger than its 
original background rate of 2 percent, which is the same rate as in the 
controls. In this case the expected percent of cancers in the treated 
group is 32 percent (15 x 2 + 2). For such a potent carcinogen �there 
is only a 3 percent chance of a false negative ( 8  • .03). This calcu­
lation assumes that the Fisher exact test is set in the traditional way 
with the probability of a false positive a equal to 5 percent. 
However, when the chemical has acute toxicity as well as long 
term cancer effects, it may not be possible to give high enough doses 
to achieve an excess cancer risk of 15 fold. Suppose we are dealing 
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with the same carcinogen but it has acutely toxic effects, and we have 
to cut down the dose to one third or one quarter its previous level. 
At the lower dose level, the excess risk of this carcinogen is much 
smaller, perhaps 5 fold increase over the background level, with an 
excess risk of 10 percent. The chance of a false negative in this case 
is 54 percent. 
This example suggests why it is so important to conduct ana­
lyses of statistical power, when dealing with toxic chemicals and other 
problems of environmental risk.10 In many cases the probability of 
detection ( B is the probability of non-detection), depends very sensi­
tively on the magnitude of the effect being investigated, as we have 
just seen. A similar sensitivity of 8 with respect to the magnitude of 
the environmental effect has been shown in a study (Harris, Page and 
Reiches, 1977) on cancer and drinking water (this study is discussed in 
the next section). In testing, a negative result can mean either that 
there is no effect or that the effect exists but is undetected. There 
is si mply no way to tell which inference is more appropriate unless B 
is calculated, as a function of the magnitude of the effect of concern. 
In other words, there is virtually no meaning in a negative resuit 
without calculation of S (a power analysis). In spite of this fact few 
studies of environmental effects in coastal waters � or elsewhere � 
undertake analyses of statistical power. 
For risks to human populations small increases over background 
rates can be very i mportant. For example, it is not uncollll!l.on for an 
excess risk of 10 per million to be considered unacceptably high. 
3o 
(Just where one draws the line depends on cold-blooded balancing of the 
benefits of the chemical and magnitude of effect , along with considera-
tion of the ethics in the imposition of grave harms.) Because detecta-
bility is such an important problem, in the investigation of poten-
tially toxic chemicals, the National Cancer Institute, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, and the National Toxicological Program require 
maximally tolerated doses, as well as lower doses , in long term bioas-
says, to decrease the probability of false negatives. But there are, 
of course,  limitations to the sizes of doses which can be given, often 
because of acute toxicity, and we are not able to achieve low Ss for 
existing bioassays , for many of the effects of concern. 
Masking of chronic effects by acut e effects is especially 
important when large numb·ers of people are to be subjected to very lov 
doses. This of course may be the case for chemicals discharged into 
ocean waters and subject to dispersal and bioaccumulation. There is 
some evidence that chronic effects of genetic toxicity become linear 
with very low doses, while acute effects exhibit "safe thresholds." 
true, then, as the dose is decreased but the number of people exposed 
If 
increases in proport ion, the importance of the chronic effect increases 
relative to the acute effect. 
The question also arises as to whether low as can actually be 
achieved, due to multiple testing. Traditionally, for a given chemical 
under test the probability of a false positive is set for one site and 
one dose. Even if there is no effect at all, it appears that with 20 
sites and 2 doses there is an excellent chance of a false positive 
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somewhere in the forty experiments. Salzberg ( 1 977) raised this ques-
t ion and calculated that the chance of a false positive for the compo-
site test would be about 65 percent , if the chemical were considered to 
be a carcinogen upon a positive for one or more sites (the calculation 
assumes some statistical dependence among sites). The calculation led 
to a re-examination of the uncertaint ies associated with the specif ica-
tion of the statistical model itself. The Fisher exact test presumes 
no knowledge about the cancer incidence in the controls. Thus the 
assumption of the model assumes more uncertainty than in fact exists. 
The historical rates of cancer in the controls is well known , and this 
provides information on the probability of cancer of the controls. 
When this information on the background rate of cancer in the controls 
is taken into account , it is found that the true probability of a false 
positive is much lower than it would be if there were no information as 
to the spontaneous cancer rate in the controls. Fear s ,  Tarone and Chou 
( 1 977) recalculated the probability of a false positive for a single 
site and dose when this informat ion is taken into account and then 
found upper bounds on a for the whole experiment of 20 sites and 2 
doses. These upper bounds were b'etween 4 and 10 percent. 
lat ions do not affect S.
!he recalcu­' 
!he first point to be made here is that analyzing the uncer-
taincies in the spec ification of models is highly important , and at 
t i.mes may be even more important than analyzing the uncertainties 
within specified models. The second point is that in presetting a to 5 
percent there may be an acceptable trade-off between a and .B, for 
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potent carcinogens without competing toxicity, for acute effects of 
chemicals, and for many pathogens. For these cases it may be possible 
to achieve a and B both equal to or less than 5 percent. But for weak 
carcinogens with wide exposure, or for carcinogens with competing toxi-
city, presetting a to 5 percent is not acceptable without further cal-
culation. It is not a�ceptable because it may imply a B of 50 percent 
or more. If the cost of a false negative is high compared with the 
cost of a false positive, then a decision approach suggests that B be 
decreased even at the price of increasing a. Bow much $ should be 
decreased depends on the properties of the tes t ,  in particular how fast 
B can be decreased for a given increase in a; it depends as well on the 
relative costs of wrong decisions. (See the Appendix for the relation-
ship . )  
The science-first approach begins with mechanisms and effects 
and avoids judgements about the costs and benefits associated with 
effects . For this reason it is compatible with presetting a. to 5 per-
cent and then minimizing B. The procedure avoids considering the costs 
and benefits of effects. For Class I and Class II pollutants the pro-
cedure may lead to B also 5 percent or less; for Class IV pollut;nts 
the procedure may lead to very high B. The policy-first approach 
begins with consideration of the costs of wrong decisions. For Class I 
and Class II pollutants trading off a. and B to minimize the expected 
cost of wrong decisions may lead to a very similar choice of o. and B as 
in the science-first approach. But for Class IV pollutants B tends to 
be larger for a given a and the minimum expected cost trade-off of a 
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and B is likely to diverge more from the a and B defined by the science-
first approach. This means that the two approaches are likely to differ 
most for Class IV pollutants in their implications as to which precaution-
ary decisions are worthwhile. 
To summarize: the science-first approach focuses on the proba-
bility of a false positive and on proving the existence of an effect. 
In the policy-first approach all four ingredients � the cost and pro­
bability of a false positive and the cost and probability of a false 
negative are symmetric and equally important for a concept of 
acceptable risk. Where the cost of a false negative is likely to be 
higher than the cost of a false positive, the probability of a false 
negative (B) is more critically sensitive for the decision than the 
probability of a false positive (a).  'When both a. and B can be made 
small, perhaps both 5 percent or less, this difference in approach is 
not likely to matter very much. But when there is more uncertainty in 
the new information (for example, the sum of a. plus B is SO percent or 
more ) ,  and when there is considerable uncertainty as to the likelihood 
of the underlying hypothesi s ,  then the two approaches are likely to 
diverge in their i.I:J.plications as to which effects are "positive" �and 
which to be taken seriously for decision purposes. 
Comparison with Drinking Water Carcinogenicity 
There are now some thirty or more studies of the potential 
cancer hazard from chemicals in drinking water (for a review see Crump 
and Guess > 1980) . In contrast there appear to be few studies of the 
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potential cancer hazard from chemicals discharged into salt water. A 
comparison of the two potential hazards suggests some parallels as well 
as obvious differences. It also provides an illustration of asym­
metries typical in environmental risks. 
In 1974 there were 64 organic chemicals identified in drinking 
water; by 1981 there were over 700. These 700 represent , by weight, 
only about 15  percent of the organic fraction of drinking water. Some 
of these chemicals come from agricultural runoff, some fall out from 
the air, and many come from industrial discharges through municipal 
sewage systems. Presumably the same chemicals are to be found in 
wastewater and sludge discharges into coastal waters , but concentra­
tions are likely to be larger in wastewater and sludge, because in 
drinking water the chemicals are identified "at the tapn rather than at 
the discharge pipe. 
In addition, a large (but unknown) number of halogenated chemi­
cals are synthesized by the chlorination process, acting on organic 
precursors. In the case of chlorinated drinking water, a principal 
feedstock appears to be natur� lly occurring organics in soil hum�s; in 
the case of sewage chlorination, Class I pollutants .  In a mass balance 
of chlorination in drinking water, only about 10 percent of the total 
chlorine content has been identified in product chemicals. Brominated 
species are formed as well, due to chlorine's greater chemical activity 
and the presence of bromide ions . Although there appears to be less 
attention paid to the cr.aracterization of halogenated compounds in 
treated wastewater, the $.9.!ik . .:>ituation presumably exists in the latter 
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case, but in intens ified form, for two reasons. First there is far 
higher organic content in wastewater and second , larger concentrations 
of chlorine are used in wastewater treatment. 
The potential human health effect has been investigated by 
means of two conceptually different methods .  In one method -- an epi­
demiologic method � human populations have been studied, comparing 
cancer rates in people with high exposure to industrialized and chlori­
nated water with cancer rates with low exposure. In the second method 
animal bioassays are used on single chemicals and the results extrapo­
lated to estimates of human risk. Epidemiologic investigation is now 
in its third stage. In the first stage, whole populations were stu­
died, with aggregate measures of exposure (for one of the first 
attempts at this see Page et al . ,  1976) . These studies were primarily 
useful in constructing hypotheses. For example, they pinpointed canc­
ers of the gastro�ntestinal tract as of special concern and they sug­
gested that, at least from present cancers resulting from exposures 30 
to 40 years ago, chlorination might have been a more important factor 
than the aggregate presence of synthetic organics of that time. 
In the second stage case control studies were conducted. These 
studies characterized exposures much more precisely, on an individual­
by-individual basis. While a number of questions about dose-response 
relationships and possibly confounding variables remain, the case con­
trol studies have tended to confirm and sharpen the evidence for a car­
cinogenic risk from drinking water (Crump and Gues s ,  1980). One of the 
main problems with the existino case control studies is that they are 
42 
too small in scale to detect excess risks of 5 to 20 percent over the 
background as statistically significant at the 5 percent level (a �
0.05). These are the excesses suggested by both the ecologic and the 
case control studies. In the third stage, larger case control studies 
are being undertaken to increase the statistical power of the tests. 
But even at this third stage, with sample sizes of 3000, the trade-off 
of ex and B is unfavorable. To detect an increase of risk of 15 percent 
over background, with traditional probability of false positive set at 
' 
5 percent , there is still an 80 percent probability of false negative 
( a = 0.05, B = 0.80). 
In the second method, chemicals are identified in the water, 
along with their concentrations. Carcinogenic potency is taken from 
animal studies such as the National Cancer Institute;s bioassays. 11
This effect is then extrapolated from the high dose of the experiment 
to the low dose in the water and extrapolated across the species lines 
from rodents to humans, taking into account differing metabolisms , body 
weight and lifetimes. The early extrapolation studies focused entirely 
on chloroform. Later studies included extrapolations on all the chemi-
, 
cals identified in drinking water as carcinogens for which animal stu-
dies exist, but chloroform remains the principal chemical of concern 
for drinking water. 
Quantitative estimates arising from two independent data bases 
provide a check of one on the other. Both suggest a carcinogenic risk. 
Both approaches are highly uncertain in their quantitative estimates of 
excess risk and neither proves beyond a doubt that a non-negligible 
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risk exists. But most interesting, the two approaches yield risk esti-
mates that are within about an order of magnitude of each other, 
roughly in the range of 0.5 to 5 percent excess over background. Given 
the uncertainties associated with each method, probably at least an 
order of magnitude or two for eacb , . the two methods agree within their 
range of resolution. The rough agreement between the two methods is 
much more suggestive than the implications of either method taken by 
itself. (See Crump and Guess, 1980, for a comparison of the two 
approaches.) 
A second observation is that the risk estimated from the animal 
studies is considerably lower than that from the epidemiological stu-
dies. This could be due to chance, or uncertainty in the specification 
of the models. It could be due to the fact that the extrapolations 
only take into account the small fraction of chemicals yet identified. 
Or it could be due to the neglect of chemical interactions in the 
extrapolation approach. (There are tests for toxicity of wastewater 
taken as a whole but these are almost always for acute effects.) 
Because the comparison of risk estimates in drinking water suggests 
, 
that for longer term effects like cancer synergisms may be important , 
such possible chemical interactions deserve much more consideration in 
the setting of standards for coastal waters. 
Analysis of the i mplications of one of the regression equations 
in an ecologic study of drinking water suggests asymmetries which may 
be typical for environmental risks associated with ocean discharge of 
potentially toxic chemicals. (It appears that there are few, if any, 
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NOTES FOR FIGURE 2 
Statistical power, which is read on left scale, is the probability of 
dectection as a function of the magnitude of the effect. One minus the power 
i.s a, the probability of non-detection. The probability of (erroneous) detection, 
when there is no effect, is c. 
D is the ratio of the cost of a fa1se negative to the cost of a false posi­
tive. D - l is the ratio of the benefit of precautionary control to the cost 
of control. Both are ft.mctions of the magnitude of effect, and they are read on 
the right scale. 
The regression equation analyzed is 
where 
M = 49 - l2(R) - l.8 (I) + 62{W) 
(9.9) (-4.4) (-3.8) (5.0) 
M Gastrointestinal Cancer White Males 
R Urbanization 
I Median Family Income 
W Percent Mississippi Water 
t Values in Parentheses 
The judgements of likelihOod in quotes are qualified versions of N, the 
subjective odds against the environmental hypothesis. These were informal judge­
ments , made by commentators, at the time of the original research, and never 
quantified. 
The annual costs of control, by granular activated carbon, are estimated 
for a city of 1,193,000; trihalomethane concentration 250 ppb; GAC 90 percent 
effective removed; benefit per cancer prevented 500,000; steady state comparison. 
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corresponding analyses of risk for coastal discharge, so we are left 
with the fresh water comparison.) Figure 2 shows a regression relating 
parish ( county) cancer rates of the gastrointestinal tract , for white 
males, in Louisiana, to the percent of the parish drinking water from 
the �ississippi and other contaminated surface water compared with less 
cont3lllinated ground water (W) , occupational exposure (I) , and urbaniza­
tion of the parish (R) .12 Even though the drinking water variable is 
-highly significant ( indicating that a complete switch from ground to 
surface water is assoc iated with 60 extra cancers per million popula­
tion per year) , the statistical power associated with this point esti-
mate is very low. Under the assumption that the underlying model is 
correctly specified � an assumption requiring examination because 
models are almost always misspecified in some ways � the regression 
bas the following interpretation. If the number of excess cancers is 
140 per million, then there is about a 95 percent chance that the 
regression will find a drinking water effect ,  by producing a coeffi-
cient for the drinking water variable positive and statistically signi-
ficant at the traditional level ( S  � 0.05 or p < 0 . 05) . But if the 
excess mortality is 62 per million1 which happens to be the poin� esti-
mate of the regression, then there is only about a 40 percent probabil-
ity of detection. The basic reason for low statistical power is that 
there are large numbers of people at risk, but the risk for each is 
small ( the ''binomial variance" problem) . The ''binomial variance prob-
lem" would also apply to any effort to quantify the risks from chemi-
cals discharged in wastewater and sludge in coastal waters . In addi-
tion., the problem would apply in intens ified form, due to the greater 
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dispersal and greater numbers of people, and other species , ultimately 
exposed if there is bioaccumulation. The limitation of statistical 
power from binomial variance for this regression equation is graphed on 
Figure 2. As would be expected, the larger the actual effec t ,  the 
greater is the statistical power. 
The cost of precautionary control ,  computed for a city of 1 . 2  
million considering drinking water filtration by granular activated 
carbon, was estimated by EPA to be $10.3 million annually. 13 The 
annual benefit of precautionary action depends linearly on the magni­
tude of the cancer risk, the effectiveness of the treatment, and the 
value attributed to each cancer prevented. Thus the ratio of benefit­
to-cost is a linear function of the size of the carcinogenic effect and 
is graphed on Figure 2. It can be seen that if there were 100 or more 
excess cancers per million then the chance of detection would be about 
80 percent ( S  • 0 . 20 ) ;  moreover, with this large an effect the benefits 
of control would be roughly five times the costs. However, the princi­
pal area of interest is not at 100 excess cancers per million. In 
accordance with the existing information at the time, the likelihood of 
such an extreme effect would be considered extremely low. The p;inci­
pal area of interest is where the st�tistical power is low � in the 
range of 0-3 excess cancers. which at the titae was considered increas­
ingly unlikely at the high end , but still plausibly credible. But 
where the initial assessment of likelihood becomes higher , the statist­
ical power diminishes. and the cost-benefit ratio becomes smaller. 
The problem can be compared with se�rching for a needle in a 
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haystack . First of all , the needle iaay not be in the haystack at all 
( the low probability of the adverse hypothesis, ·Or high N) . But if the 
needle is in the haystack, it is hard to find ( low statistical power in 
the area of interest, or high 8) . But if the needle is present and we 
miss it, we pay a high price (a high cost of the effect cgmpared with 
the cost of precautionary action) , or high D. Clearly in such a case 
it is important to analyze farefully the sources of uncertainty and to 
search for statistical models and tests that are sufficiently powerful 
to be relied upon. especially in the interpretation of negative 
results . 
I'MPLICATIONS FOR THE PROCESS OF � FORMATION 
The policy approach begins with questions with decision conse­
quences. and then works back to the health and environmental effects of 
coastal discharge, and thence to the scientific models which predict 
the effects. In this approach, the value of information is the flip 
side of the cost of uncertainty. With uncertainty there is the risk of 
a wrong decision, from either a false positive or a false negative. 
The value of some new research or new piece of information is the 
reduction in the expected cost of wrong decisions. Even thOugh our 
understanding of biological and checical systems is too fragmentary to 
follow this approach in a fully quantitative way, it still suggests 
specific directions for the process of policy formation, some of which 
are discussed here. 
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Linkage 
In order to evaluate the consequences of some decision, it is 
necess�ry to link the outputs of one submodel to the input of another 
from waste treatment (Chapter 2) to the initial mixing (Chapter 4) to 
the effects (Chapters 7 ,8,9) to the control options (Chapters 12,13 ) .  
This book is a step toward linkage, as it brings together large amounts 
of relevant material from a wide variety of sources. The policy 
approach outlined in this chapter suggests continued and further atten­
tion on the linkage of the submodels. In terms of Figure 1, this means 
further attention on links (c) and especially (b) . This attention is 
in addition to (a) , which is sometimes the consW'.:ling focus of indepen­
dent scientific studies , in their concern for submodel development and 
validation. Dominance of the science-first approach may help ex.plain 
the relatively minor discussion in this volume of two subjects � fish 
tumors and the mussel watch program.. Both are mentioned as important . 
But each could deserve a whole chapter discussing their meaning . 
Because of the pervasive uncertainties these chapters would have to be 
speculative, defining questions and establishing hypotheses to be 
investigated by existing knowledge and proposed research. In the pol­
icy first approach these chapters would come at or near the beginning 
and would serve to the search for links (b) , (c) , and (a) of the fol-
lowing chapters. For a substantive but basically descriptive discus­
sion of shellfish toxicity see Nation�l Academy of Sciences (1980 ) ;  of 
fish tumors , Kraybill et al. (1977 ) .  
From the science-first approach it is perfectly reasonable to 
postpone speculative evaluation of potential harms when the basic facts 
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them.selves are speculative. The science-first approach concentrates 
first on the determination of the facts , leaving the evaluations until 
later when then they are less speculative. But a policy-first approach 
starts with speculative questions of evaluation. 
There are several reasons for concern about fish tumors and 
other biological indicators. ( 1 )  In recent work by Ames and by Messel­
son, it is becoming apparent that different species react similarly to 
carcinogens , and they are likely to yield similar rankings of potency, 
in orders of magnitude. Besides the natural repugnance in eating can­
cerous meat from fish, tumor-bearing f isb are likely to contain c3rci­
nogens dangerous to humans just as they proved to be dangerous to the 
fish. It is believed, for example, that a principal route of human 
exposure to PCBs is from fish consumption, especially fish from partic­
ularly contaminated bodies of fresh water. (2) It is possible that 
toxic chemicals may disrupt fish and other aquatic populations, affect­
ing aggregate food resources. (3)  Fish and other a�uatic organis�s.  
including plants, may provide an "early warning system" for later 
ecosystem disruptions. Early warning systems are particularly impor­
tant in the investigation of potential hazards to coastal discha�ge or 
wastewater and sludge, due to possible long dormancies of materials 
deposited in bottom sediments. Two decades ago it was thought that 
mercury discharges would safely remain on the bottom. Methylization 
came as a surprise. A decade ago it was thought that ground water con­
tamination would be a minor problem due to natural filtering in the 
soil. In the 1980s serious groundwater contamination may become 
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another surprise. It is useful to anticipate and investigate potential 
surprises before their causative factors become irreversibly beyond 
control .  (4) Fish and other organisms allow for the study of the 
effects of chemicals in combination. 
Beginning. with the speculative questions as to the meaning of 
the potential effects on hum.an health and on marine populations helps 
to formulate hypotheses and research agendas to make the evaluations 
less speculative . In doing so, it forces us to link the various submo­
dels and effects models together. Key areas of uncertainty are identi­
fied, for which resolution would establish the links more strongly. 
The point is that beginning with the evaluative questions helps focus 
the scientific activity along lines most useful for decision purposes . 
The point is not that the existing evidence of fish and shellfish con­
tamination already proves that there is an enormous problem requiring 
immediate remedial action. When the effects are better understood, it 
may turn out that contamination problems are small ,  requiring only a 
little control here and there; or it may turn out otherwise. 
Combining Science and Policy Approaches 
The "ultimate" policy questions listed at the beginning of the 
chapter do not spring from a vacuum. In large part, the existing sci­
ence suggests the policy questions worth worrying about . Thus the pro­
cess of policy formation needs to encourage both approaches simultane­
ously, one beginning with science questions, the other with policy 
questions . 
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It is sometimes suggested that the work of the policy analysts 
and decis ion makers be kept separate from the work of the scientists, 
perhaps because the questions of evaluation might taint the science. A 
division of labor is fine, but only insofar as the divided labors fit 
together in a common framework. The one offered here is that of minim­
izing expected cost. In this framework it is not possible to define a 
positive test result without making evaluations. This is because ct and 
8 trade off. Nor is it possible to define a notion of acceptable risk 
without at least qualitative cost and benefit evaluations. The assess­
ment of N is a scientific judgement; the assessment of D an economic 
one. Yet the two play entirely symmetric roles in parts of the minimum 
expected cost calculation, as illustrated in the Appendix. This obser­
vation is not surprising because in a definition of expected value, N 
plays the role of a probability, D the value of a consequence ( expected 
values are probabilities times outcome values) . In the absence of 
observations, past definitions of a positive test have been attempted 
on "scientific grounds alone" and there have been similar attempts to 
define acceptable risk, and hence standards, as a scientific matter. 
Taking these observations into account means that the communi­
cation links between the scientists and the poliCy analysts need to be 
considerably improved . In the past, it has sometimes been considered 
sufficient to report a test positive or negative at some significance 
leve l ,  usually a = 5 percent . This has giv:en way to reporting p values 
and confidence intervals . It is necessary to take the next step to 
report B values , for different magnitudes of effect of concern, as a 
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routine matter (confidence intervals yield different information from S 
values ) .  It is necessary for the scientist to report further informa-
tion on uncertainty as well. The � and S values and the results of the 
test are computed under the assumption that the underlying statistical 
and physical model is correct. Generally, there are uncertainties as 
to the specification of the model, and these uncertainties must be 
reported as well. A test of whether or not enough information is being 
communicated from the scientist to the decision maker is met when the 
decision maker can himself defirie what is a positive test. Going the 
other way, the policy maker has the responsibility of communicating to 
the scientist which areas of uncertainty would have the highest payoff 
in resolution. There are a countless number of interesting scientific 
questions to pursue, and . the scientist needs information as to which 
are the most important for decision purposes. As a part of this com-
munication, the costs of wrong decisions need to be evaluated, in at 
least a rough and perhaps qualitative way, and communicated to the 
scientist. 
Surprises are more likely when we act as though existing models 
were true, when in fact there is considerable uncertainty associ�ted 
with most model specifications. Thus better communication of the 
uncertainty of model specification helps guard against surprises. 
Other potential surprises � besides the classic example of methyliza-
tion of mercury � might be identified if specification uncertainties 
were more intensively characterized and communicated. 
A vital need which becomes apparent from the policy-first 
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approach is the need to generalize. There are simply too many chemi-
cals to consider each on a one-by-one basis. Generalization is diffi-
cult when the underlying phenomena are not clearly understood; however, 
scientists have responded to this need in a creative and useful way. 
Chapter 6 summarizes and extends generalizations which help carry us 
beyond � one-by-one approach to chemicals. Particularly useful , for 
decision purposes, are generalizations based on an effect of concern, 
such as the octanol-water partition coefficient, which is a predictor 
of bi.oac.cumulation. A great deal of work is now being undertaken on 
generalizations which would help predict which chemicals are likely to 
be genotoxic. Another important effort in generalization, one which so 
far has received little resource cofilI:l.itment , is to investigate the gen-
eral principles by which chemicals are likely to act synergistically. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SPECIFIC POLICIES 
There will be further discussion of specific policies in 
Chapter 13,  but some islands of relative certainty can be tentatively 
identified here. In searching for a "relative certainty" it is useful 
, 
to look for places where the evidence ,  uncertain as it is , has tended 
to strengthen in a pa�ticular direction over time. 
� .QA  Toxics 
Evidence has increased in the last two decades that toxic chem-
icals should be taken more seriously as a potential problem This 
chapter suggests that traditional approaches to standard setting and 
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acceptable risk are less appropriate to Class IV pollutants than to the 
other s ,  and thus the traditional approach is most in need of rethinking 
in this area. 
Redirection of Secondary Treatment 
To some ex.tent requ irements for secondary treatment were esta­
blished to control toxic substances. However, it is becoming increas­
ingly c lear that the most effective way of contro lling toxic chemicals 
is by pretreatment, production contro l s ,  and source reduction. To some 
extent requirements for advanced treatment arose in response to the 
goal of minimizing discharge for all classes of pollutants into ocean 
wat ers. But in the past decade the costs of other forms of disposal of 
the increased volume of sludge from advanced treatment have been better 
understood. Incineration of sludge and land fill are seen to be 
increasingly more expensive and the concomitant environmental problems 
more app�rent, thus leading to a rethinking of the reasons for and 
costs of advanced treatment. One otherwise attractive alternative, 
land use of wastewater and s ludge for irrigation, soil conditioning and 
fertilization, largely depends on the control of Class I I ,  III and IV 
pollutant s .  And again, the only effective control of Class III and IV 
pollutants appears to be pretreatment or source control .  
� �-offs in ill Receiving Media 
Legislat ion to control wastes was enact ed, in large part, on a 
case-by-case basis, with ocean and river disposal considered sep�rately 
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from land disposal, and separately from incineration (air dispos�l ) .  
In deal ing with the problem of waste treatment and disposal compartmen­
tally, it was often required that the was te, in each case, go else­
where. But in considering the problem as a whol e ,  it is clear that it 
all goes somewhere, except for source reduction or treatment that 
transforms problem material s .  In the past decade there has been 
increasing interest in comparing and trading off the costs of disposal 
in one medium versus another. This is true for all four classes of 
pollutants and further resolutions of uncertainty are likely to 
strengthen the case for managing wastes on a multi-media basis. 
More Regionalization 
The area of least uncertainty, in modeling the life cycle of 
wastewater discharges, is in the diffus ion and transport of materials. 
A great deal is known about the way plumes move and bow basins flush, 
or don't flush ( Chapters 3 , 4, S) . Regional differences in mixing and 
transport are uell understood and have reached the point of fine tun­
ing . It is useful to take advantage of our kno�ledge of regional 
differences in designing treat1:lent and dis charge systems. 
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APPENDIX 
In minimizing the expected cost of wrong decisions , we have 
three alternative strategies: gather no further information but take 
precautionary action on the basis of existing information, with 
expected cost 
N/(N+l ) ;  ( l )  
gather no further information and take no precautionary action on the 
basis of existing information, with expected cost 
D/(N+l ) ;  (2) 
and gather further information, and act on the basis of that, in con-
junction with existing information 
D�/(N + l) + N1>/(N + l )  + T (3) 
In considering (3) we pick the most advantageous trade-o�f of 
(�, 6) ,  the pair leading to minimum (3). For a given cost of the test
the trade-off opportunities are shown in Figure 3 • By increasing the 
cost of the test (T) , the who le trade-off curve can be pushed in toward 
the origin. The best scale of the test, or research program, is 
achieved when the gains from pushing the trade-off curve inward are 
just offset by the increased cost of gathering the new information 
( increased T) . 
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FIGURE 3 
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For expository purposes, we are discussing a simple hypothesis 
and a simple alternative (a hypothesis with a single environmental 
effect, or no effect at all) . In this case the trade-off curve defines 
the 11most powerful t.est" for each significance leve l .  In the more com-
plicated case of many hypotheses and many alternatives the approach of 
minimizing expected cost is directly generalizable. 
To show the relative rankings of the three strategies, and the 
best choice for the ( a , 8) trade-off, we change the scale by multiplying 
each of the expected costs in (1) , (2) , and (3)  by (N+l ) / D .  We seek 
the minimum of ( 1) ,  (2) , and (3) by seeking the minimum of 
N/D ( l ) '  
l (2)' 
$ + 
N 
na + T(N + l)/D (3) '  
By drawing the line segment from ( l . O )  with slope -N/D, ( 1 ) '
shows up on the y-axis as marked ( ! ) ' .  For comparison ( l ) '  i s  just a 
unit up on this same axis. To compare the best (3)' with the (1)' and 
(2) ' ,  draw the tangent with slope -N/D to the trade-off curve. The a
and 8 at this tangency comprise th� cost minimizing trade-off of a and 
S for the given test cost T. Where this tangent hits the y-axis add 
T(N+l ) / D ,  to locate ( 3 ) ' .  Of the three strategies the one lowest on 
the y-axis is the least cost minimizing �lternative. 
It can be readily seen that any other choice of ·Cl and B other 
than the one picked out by the tangent with slope -N/D would have a 
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higher expected cost than for ( 3 ) '  defined by the tangency solution 
(the tangent leads to the lowest (3)'  on the y-axis) . In particular 
note that the traditional way of selecting the (a,S) trade-off is very 
unlikely to pick out the cost minimizing combination. In the tradi-
tional selection of the (n,S) trade-off is chosen to be 5 percent and 
S is chosen as whatever is compatible with this preselection. In other 
words where vertical dashed line through x-axis at 0.05 crosses the 
(a,8) trade-off curve, the trade-off of a a and 8 is chosen. 
The geometry of Figure 3 shows how the factors discussed in the 
Chapter combine to determine the expected cost: the existing inform.a-
tion translated into a statement of the level of suspicion about the 
adverse hypothesis (N) ; the relative costs of precaution and the poten-
tial risk (D) ; and the sharpness of the test or additional information 
in resolving uncertainty, summarized in the (a, $) trade-off curve.
Figure 3 shows that in one part of the cost minimization N and D play , 
entirely symmetric roles , and in another part they play different 
roles. Figure 3 suggests that it is not worth obtaining fine tuned 
information on D if we are very vague as to N and vice. versa. More­
over, Figure a shows the difference between the approach of cost .. minim-
ization and the one of classical hypothesis testing. 
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Footnotes 
1. An engineering approach which attempts to optimize over a whole 
system, like the policy approach, may also begin with general questions 
of costs and benefits (list A) and move toward specific ones of model­
ing. The problem, of course, is to resolve questions like those in 
list A sufficiently to define an objective function which can be optim­
ized. When the objective function is narrowly and exogeneously 
prescribed, for example, "design the least expensive tertiary treatment 
plant meeting the following specifications .. . .  " ,  the approach becomes 
suboptimization. 
2. The inventory of the Toxic Substances Control Act (Section S(b)) 
contains about 65,000 chemicals in active cot:lI!lercial use. This inven­
tory does not list a number of pesticides and other chemicals con­
trolled by other laws. The estimate of 10,000 additional cheaicals 
itself is highly uncertain, and indeed the number on the inventory is 
not definite, due to problems of listing. Thus there is considerable 
uncertainty in the number of chemicals in active commerce, let alone 
the number and mass flows of chemicals in municipal sewage systetlS . 
3 .  Even for the "simple" cases quantitative cost-benefit analysis is 
difficult in practice, and sometimes there are legal obstacles to trad­
ing off control options, across media. (See Freeman [l979a] for a 
review of cost-benefit studies of water pollution control.) 
4. The effects of a Class II pathogen producing cholera are more 
reversible than the effects of a Class IV chemical producing cancer, in 
the sense that the effects are longer term for the latter. Once 
cholera is controlled, the full effects of disease reduction are almost 
immediate. But once PCBs are controlled it will take decades, perhaps 
centuries, before the original position is regained. Of course, for 
the individual who dies of either cholera or cancer, the effects are 
irreversible in either case. 
5. These characteristics are: strong uncertainty as to mechanism, 
relatively modest cost of precautionary action in comparison with the 
potential severity of the environmental harm, low assessed probability 
of harm, irreversibility of potential harm, latency of harm, external 
costs, internal benefits of risk, and wide dispersal of risk (collec­
tive risk). See Page (1978). 
6. A test false positive can be distinguished from the false positive 
of precautionary control in the previous discussion. But when tests 
are followed one mistake leads to the other ar.d the . two concepts of 
false positive become linked. 
7 .  Expected cost is the probability of harm times the potenti:il .,J:l.:lg.ni­
tude of the harm. When there are several possible severities and pro­
babilities these products are summed, as in the third case: below. 
8. There are several complicating factors. First, it can be asked : Is 
not the cost of remedy overstated, due to postponement of con� t�uction 
and the discounting of future construction costs? Ordinarily one would 
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say ye , but the matter is complicated by the fact that the D should 
11really11 be defined in terms of potential environmental costs , and in 
some sense the remedy costs are a proxy. Second , some of the potential 
environmental costs will begin to accrue right away, under a false 
negative, so that these should not be discounted. Third , the probleu 
of discounting becomes deeper when considerations of intertemporal 
equity are taken into account (see Page, 1980; and Ferejohn, 1978) . And 
fourth, there is the problem of establishing incentive compatibility. 
Suppose for the sake of illustration that the incremental 
environmental harm, if the extension is not built ,  is three units.  
Because the cost of extension at the time of original construction is 
only one unit ,  the extension is worth undertaking. However, there is 
an incentive for the sewerage agency to minimize construction costs, sub­
ject to meeting predicted water quality constraints. This situation 
produces an incentive for the agency to predict low enviroru:i.ental 
impacts. Once the outfall is built too soall ,  the incremental cost 
calculation goes the other way. Now it costs six units to control 
three units of environmental dam.age, and the agency can legitimately 
argue that the incremental construction is no longer worth the cost. 
Thus an agency with an incentive to minimize its interna1 con­
struction and operation costs has an incentive to underbuild at the 
time of original construction. To off set this incentive, the agency 
might be told beforehand that remedy is likely to be required. The 
state or federal agency may develop the follow�ng policy. It announces 
to the sewerage agency before there is any construction that if it turns 
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out that the environmental costs are 3 units,  the sewer agency will be 
required to retrofit, even at the cost of 6 units. With this policy, 
there is greater incentive for the agency to build the outfall longer 
in the first place, for a net saving of 3-1 or 2 units. (See,  for dis­
cussion of rules of remedy, in another context but still for expected 
cost minimization , K.ronman and Posner ( 1979 ) . )  The cost of remedy would 
be a consideration in setting up such a policy rule. Establishing a 
policy rule to minimize expected costs across the who le decision pro­
cess, as in this case, is an example of the 11principle-agent problen.11 
9 .  Personal communication, N.H. Brooks , February 1981. 
10. "Statistical power" and 11probability of false negatives11 are 
equivalent concepts .  The first is the probability of detection, the 
second the probability of non-detection. They are both functions of 
the magnitude of effect being investigated, and for each magnitude of 
effect they sum to one. Statistical power is 1- S .  
1 1 .  One definition o f  potency i s  the daily dose ill mg per kg of body 
weight leading to cancer in 50 percent of the treated animals , 
corrected for competing mortality and cancer in the controls . 
12. The statistical analysis is discussed in more detail in Har;is et 
al. (1977 ) .  
13. This cost-benefit analysis is discussed in more detail in Page et 
al. (in press). 
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